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ABSTRACT. The integration of science and traditional knowledge (TEK), a cornerstone of contemporary cooperative
management, entails translating First Nation people’s life experiences into forms compatible with state wildlife management (e.g.,
numbers and lines on maps), with all the risks of distortion inherent in any translation process. Even after such a translation,
however, knowledge-integration remains fraught with difficulties, many of which seem on the surface to be technical or
methodological. Surprisingly, despite these difficulties, the literature is full of accounts of successful co-management. I call for
a more critical and nuanced analysis of co-management, one that takes different perspectives into account and calls into question
what we mean by “success” in the first place. To this end, I examine the case of the Ruby Range Sheep Steering Committee
(RRSSC), a co-management body in the southwest Yukon that some have held up as a model of success. Over the course of three
years, RRSSC members gathered information about Dall sheep (Ovis dalli dalli) from many sources and managed to express it
all in forms compatible with scientific wildlife management. Yet, even then—with a single exception—RRSSC members failed
to integrate their knowledge about sheep. Although there were numerous technical and methodological obstacles to knowledge-
integration, the underlying reasons for this failure were ultimately political. Thus, a focus on the political dimensions of
knowledge-integration is essential to an understanding and assessment of co-management.
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RÉSUMÉ. L’intégration de la science et du savoir écologique traditionnel (SET), une pierre angulaire de la cogestion pratiquée
de nos jours, nécessite que soit traduit le vécu des gens des Premières nations sous des formes compatibles avec la gestion
gouvernementale de la faune (p. ex., chiffres et lignes sur les cartes), avec les risques de distorsion inhérents à toute opération
traduisante. Mais même après une telle traduction, l’intégration du savoir reste truffée de difficultés, dont un grand nombre semble
être de prime abord d’ordre technique ou méthodologique. Curieusement, malgré ces difficultés, la documentation regorge de
témoignages de cogestion réussie. Je réclame une analyse plus critique et plus nuancée de la cogestion, une analyse qui tienne
compte de différents points de vue et remette en question ce que l’on entend tout d’abord par «réussite». À cette fin, j’examine
le cas du Comité directeur du mouflon de Ruby Range (RRSSC), organisme de cogestion situé dans le sud-ouest du Yukon et qui
est cité par certains comme un modèle de réussite. Au cours d’une durée de trois ans, les membres du RRSSC ont collecté de
l’information sur le mouflon de Dall (Ovis dalli dalli) auprès de sources multiples et ils sont parvenus à l’exprimer entièrement
sous des formes compatibles avec la gestion scientifique de la faune. Pourtant, même là – à une exception près –, les membres
du RRSSC ne sont pas arrivés à intégrer leur savoir sur le mouflon. Bien qu’il y ait eu de nombreux obstacles techniques et
méthodologiques à l’intégration du savoir, les raisons sous-jacentes à cet échec étaient en fin de compte politiques. Pour
comprendre et évaluer la cogestion, il est donc essentiel de se concentrer sur les dimensions politiques de l’intégration du savoir.
Mots clés: savoir écologique traditionnel, cogestion, espace, temps, confiance, pouvoir, mouflon de Dall, faune, Premières
nations, Yukon
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, biologists and aboriginal people across
the North have begun cooperating with one another to
manage northern wildlife populations. Such efforts have
intensified to the point that today cooperative management
(or co-management) has become the norm. A wide variety
of co-management regimes and programs are currently in
place throughout the North American Arctic and Subarctic.
A cornerstone of co-management is the recognition on the
part of biologists and scientific resource managers of the
existence of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and
its potential value in the management process, and a pri-
mary goal of co-management has been to gather this TEK
from the aboriginal elders and hunters who hold it and to
integrate it with the scientific knowledge produced by
biologists and other scientists.
The proliferation of co-management policies and initia-
tives has been accompanied by a burgeoning literature,
both academic and policy-oriented. Although some of this
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literature examines the phenomenon of co-management in
general or theoretical terms, much of it consists of case
studies that assess particular instances of co-management
(e.g., Williams and Hunn, 1982; Freeman and Carbyn,
1988; Johannes, 1989; Inglis, 1993; many more examples
can be found in the “gray literature” of government re-
ports). Such case studies have also constituted the majority
of the presentations at every co-management conference
and symposium I have attended in the North (e.g., Roberts,
1996; Urquhart, 2001). Even a cursory perusal of this
literature reveals a striking fact: virtually every co-man-
agement case study encountered in the literature is a
success story. The authors of these studies portray the co-
management processes they studied in a positive light,
giving the impression that, although we still have much to
learn, the use of TEK and its integration with science have
already significantly improved the practice of wildlife
management in the North and have helped to give aborigi-
nal people more control over local land and resources. A
more thorough examination of the literature bears out this
initial impression; indeed, I have yet to come across a
single account of failed co-management in the North. It is
true that many studies identify technical problems with the
design and implementation of various co-management
processes. However, while they argue that these problems
can detract somewhat from the effectiveness of the co-
management process under scrutiny, they tend to view
such problems neither as insurmountable nor as invalidat-
ing the overall process.
A few scholars who have critically examined the project
of knowledge-integration and its underlying assumptions
(e.g., Cruikshank, 1998; Fienup-Riordan, 1998; Nadasdy,
1999) offer theoretical critiques of the general process, but
no one presents a detailed study of a particular case of co-
management that failed. And such critiques stand in strik-
ing contrast to the many successful case studies that
comprise the bulk of the TEK literature. One might reason-
ably point to all those case studies and declare that co-
management seems to be proceeding quite smoothly,
despite the theoretical objections raised by a few critics.
But the very lack of documented failures in the co-man-
agement literature is in itself suspicious.
In the first place, everyone, scholars, government offi-
cials, and aboriginal people alike, agrees that the cross-
cultural negotiations involved in co-management and
knowledge-integration are exceedingly difficult and com-
plex. It therefore seems highly improbable that every
single effort at co-management to date could have met
with success. Second, one need only listen to the coffee-
break conversations between official presentations at co-
management conferences to know that not everyone agrees
with the glowing “official” assessments of co-manage-
ment practice. On numerous occasions at such confer-
ences, I have heard aboriginal people (who were involved
in the very same co-management processes that were the
subjects of positive presentations by government resource
managers) complaining that things hadn’t worked out
quite the way government managers presented them. Fi-
nally, I am suspicious of the entire “co-management suc-
cess story” genre, in large part because of my own
experiences with a particular process of co-management:
that of the Ruby Range Sheep Steering Committee
(RRSSC), an ad hoc co-management body created in 1995
to address concerns about declines in a population of Dall
sheep (Ovis dalli dalli) in the southwest Yukon.
It would be difficult to maintain the position that the
RRSSC process was a success. On the contrary, it was, in
many ways, a dismal failure, although not everyone in-
volved in the process would agree with that assessment.
Indeed, one of the most striking things about the RRSSC
process is how differently various members of the commit-
tee perceived and evaluated what took place over the
nearly three years during which they met to formulate
management recommendations. Some RRSSC members
(mostly government scientists and resource managers)
came away from the process feeling that it had been a
success. Indeed, I heard several biologists who had been
on the committee describe the process in glowing terms,
holding it up as a model of co-management to be emulated
elsewhere in the territory. However, other committee mem-
bers, mostly First Nation people, felt that it had been a
complete failure (and worse, that government biologists
had betrayed them).
In this article, I examine certain aspects of the RRSSC
process with an eye to understanding how members of the
RRSSC could have perceived the process so differently
from one another. I make no claims that my critique of the
RRSSC can be generalized and applied to all processes of
co-management, but some of the patterns and dynamics I
describe are widespread and general enough to suggest
that similar criticisms might be applied to other co-man-
agement processes as well. My goal here is not to make
general statements of co-management writ large, but to
cultivate a healthy skepticism of the “co-management
success story” and call for more critical and nuanced
analyses of particular co-management processes, analyses
that call into question how we might go about evaluating
such processes.
Finally, it is not my intention here to pass judgment on
any of those who participated in the RRSSC process. On
the contrary, I believe that nearly everyone involved par-
ticipated in good faith, sincerely hoping to work together to
solve a common problem in an atmosphere of trust, respect,
and cooperation. Rather, I am critical of the process itself
and seek to understand the social interactions between
members of the RRSSC in light of the unexamined assump-
tions that they brought to the table and the larger political
context of sheep management in the territory.
THE CASE OF THE MISSING SHEEP
Elsewhere (Nadasdy, 1999), I have examined the political
consequences of the effort to integrate TEK and science
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for purposes of co-management. I argued that since the
project of knowledge-integration assumes that the utility
of TEK lies in its incorporation into existing structures of
state resource management, TEK researchers necessarily
treat TEK as simply a new form of “data” to be incorpo-
rated into existing management bureaucracies and acted
upon by scientists and resource managers (see also
Cruikshank, 1998). This necessitates the translation (and
distortion) of First Nation people’s beliefs, values, social
relations, and practices into forms (e.g., numbers and lines
on maps) that are more compatible with bureaucratic
resource management than with the lives of First Nation
elders and hunters. Further, I argued that TEK researchers’
preoccupation with technical and methodological obsta-
cles to knowledge-integration have obscured the power
relations that underlie the whole process of knowledge-
integration and co-management. The supposedly technical
process of translation takes the very institutions and prac-
tices of bureaucratic management as givens (see also
Nadasdy, in press). Because of this, the process of knowl-
edge-integration and co-management ends up taking for
granted existing aboriginal-state relations and perpetuat-
ing (rather than transforming) unequal power relations.
Here, however, I examine the next stage of the co-
management process: that which follows the translation of
First Nation experiences into TEK. After all, despite eve-
rything that is lost and transformed in the process of
translating First Nation people’s lived experiences into
numbers and lines on maps, something survives. The
numerical and graphic understandings sought by biolo-
gists are not completely foreign to the experiences of First
Nation people. Elders and hunters often possess detailed
knowledge about animals (how many, when, and where)
that can be expressed in forms that are entirely compatible
with those regularly used by biologists. These numbers
and lines on maps, however decontextualized they may be,
are nevertheless rooted in First Nation elders’ and hunters’
experiences on the land. Thus, some might argue that
integrating these numbers with the knowledge of biolo-
gists should still be of some benefit despite the problems
inherent in the translation process. And, precisely because
these numbers and lines on maps have been
decontextualized, this integration should be fairly straight-
forward. Yet, even after First Nation people and biologists
have agreed on the numbers and what they mean, knowl-
edge-integration remains fraught with difficulties. Many
of these obstacles to integration appear to be technical or
methodological in nature. Just as in the case of gathering
and translating TEK, however, it would be a mistake to
focus solely on the technical dimensions of this stage of
knowledge-integration. To do so would ignore the politi-
cal context in which it takes place and take for granted
existing political inequalities.
RRSSC members did indeed face technical and meth-
odological obstacles in their attempts to gather and inte-
grate different ways of knowing about sheep. Over the
course of nearly three years, however, they intentionally
worked to overcome these obstacles. They gathered infor-
mation about Dall sheep from various sources, including
First Nation elders and hunters, outfitters, and biologists,
and successfully managed to express it all in a form
compatible with scientific wildlife management practice
(see Nadasdy, 2003: chap. 4). As I have noted elsewhere
(Nadasdy, 1999, 2003: chap. 5), this process was itself far
from politically neutral. Yet, by rendering the information
gathered from these disparate sources into forms that were
compatible with one another, RRSSC members did set the
stage for their integration. Even then, however, with a
single exception, they failed to do so. To understand why,
it will be helpful to look at the one case of successful
knowledge-integration that did occur. An examination of
this instance provides insights into why such integration
did not occur more often.
In July 1996, Yukon government biologists conducting
an aerial survey of the Ruby Range in the southwest Yukon
counted 147 fewer Dall sheep than they had just the year
before—an apparent decline of almost 26% in the course
of a single year. This drop in the population was poten-
tially of serious concern to the members of the RRSSC.
When biologists presented their results to the committee
on 28 January 1997, however, no alarms were sounded.
Indeed, by that time, they were confident that the sheep
population had not in fact declined at all. Significantly, the
biologists had not come to this conclusion on their own;
instead, they had come to their current knowledge of the
sheep population by integrating their own knowledge (the
product of aerial surveys and other techniques of scientific
wildlife management) with the very different knowledge
of another member of the RRSSC.
Any attempt to understand why the biologists were not
worried about the sheep population must begin with a look
at the unusual circumstances surrounding the aerial survey
itself. For one thing, biologists performed the 1996 annual
survey in July rather than in June, when it was normally
conducted. The second unusual circumstance was that
there was still significant snow cover in the mountains
when the survey was carried out, making it harder to spot
the white Dall sheep from the air. The biologists later
confessed that these factors had caused them to mistrust
the results of their survey and suspect they were not
comparable to the survey data from previous years. Fortu-
nately, the big game outfitter in the area, also a member of
the RRSSC, conducted his own sheep count during the
autumn 1996 hunting season. Eight hunting guides work-
ing for him counted the sheep in his outfitting area and
obtained results very similar to those of the Yukon govern-
ment’s aerial survey—except in one game management
subzone, where they counted approximately 100 more
sheep than had been counted in the helicopter survey.
What is more, they counted all of those 100 sheep in an
area where the aerial survey had found no sheep at all.
After the hunting season, the biologists and the outfitter
met to compare data. Together they decided that the heli-
copter survey must have missed those 100 sheep because
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they were outside the study area in July, though they had
returned to it by the start of the hunting season a few weeks
later. They jointly concluded that the drop in the sheep
count represented problems with the survey (different
time of year, snow cover, and 100 moving sheep) rather
than a drop in the actual number of sheep. So, by the time
they presented the survey results to the other RRSSC
members in January 1997, biologists felt confident that it
was their survey data, rather than the sheep population,
that had a problem.
This tale of the 100 missing sheep should be heart-
warming to proponents of co-management. It is a perfect
example of the kind of “knowledge-integration” that is
supposed to be the centerpiece of co-management prac-
tice. By integrating the outfitter’s local, land-based knowl-
edge with the scientific knowledge generated by biologists,
these RRSSC members had improved everyone’s overall
knowledge of the sheep; and by working together in this
way, biologists and outfitter had helped to build trust and
a cooperative relationship among (at least certain) mem-
bers of the RRSSC. That this occurred should not be
particularly surprising. After all, knowledge-integration
of this sort is integral to the very idea of co-management.
Aware of the limitations of wildlife biology and other
management sciences, biologists and scientific resource
managers have increasingly come to recognize the value of
traditional/local knowledge not only as a corrective to the
knowledge they generate, but also to fill in the temporal
and geographical gaps in that knowledge. This was cer-
tainly one of the goals underlying the creation of the
RRSSC in the first place.
As it turns out, there were numerous instances over the
course of the RRSSC process in which committee mem-
bers might profitably have worked together to integrate
their knowledge of Dall sheep in precisely this way.
Unfortunately, the case described above was virtually the
only significant instance of knowledge-integration that
occurred during the entire RRSSC process, a process that
involved not only Yukon biologists and outfitters, but also
First Nation people, federal government officials, and
members of interested environmental organizations. Why,
if everyone involved in the RRSSC process endorsed the
idea of knowledge-integration (and they did), was there
only a single instance in which they actually achieved it?
And is it significant that the one successful case of knowl-
edge-integration involved biologists and an outfitter—and
not First Nation people? To answer these questions, we
must begin by examining those methodological obstacles
to knowledge-integration that remained even after the
translation process. We can then ask how and why these
obstacles were overcome in one case, but not others. This
inquiry will ultimately lead us away from issues of tech-
nique and methodology to questions of power. I begin,
however, with a very brief background discussion of the
RRSSC and the politics of sheep hunting in the Yukon (for
a more complete discussion of the context in which the
RRSSC operated, see Nadasdy 2003: chap. 4).
THE RUBY RANGE SHEEP STEERING COMMITTEE
AND THE POLITICS OF SHEEP IN THE YUKON
In the fall of 1995, the Kluane First Nation (KFN)
hosted a meeting in the village of Burwash Landing,
Yukon, to express their concerns about declining
populations of Dall sheep in the region. This meeting led
directly to the creation of the Ruby Range Sheep Steering
Committee. Participants at the meeting selected RRSSC
representatives from a wide range of groups with interests
in Ruby Range sheep, including local First Nations, the
territorial government (Department of Renewable Re-
sources), the federal government (Parks Canada and the
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development),
local big game outfitters, and interested environmental
organizations (the Yukon Conservation Society and the
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society). The RRSSC was
to make management recommendations regarding Ruby
Range sheep to the Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management
Board, a body established under the 1993 Yukon Umbrella
Final Agreement as the “primary instrument of fish and
wildlife management” in the territory (Council for Yukon
Indians, 1993:166). To this end, the committee met several
times over the next three years.
It became apparent over the course of these meetings
that different participants in the RRSSC had radically
different ideas about the magnitude of the decline in the
sheep population, the reasons for this decline, and poten-
tial management solutions. Biologists and outfitters sit-
ting on the RRSSC saw the population decline as relatively
minor, a temporary fluctuation caused by several years of
unusually bad weather, possibly exacerbated by predation
(from wolves and coyotes) and harassment from low-
flying aircraft and all-terrain vehicles. Significantly, nei-
ther biologists nor outfitters felt that hunting by humans
had contributed to the sheep decline. Ultimately, they felt
that the sheep population would recover on its own, but
they were willing to support management initiatives that
addressed the issues of predation and harassment to help
speed the population’s recovery. Both opposed any re-
strictions on hunting, the outfitters adamantly so.
By contrast, Kluane First Nation members of the RRSSC
saw the decline in the sheep population as long-term and
catastrophic. They argued that the population had been
declining steadily since the 1960s and that the situation
had now reached crisis proportions. They agreed with
biologists and outfitters that predation and harassment
were factors in the decline, but they vehemently disagreed
with them about the role of weather and human hunting.
Sheep, they felt, were quite accustomed to Yukon weather,
and, in any case, a few bad years could not explain a long-
term decline of the sort they had seen. Some elders and
hunters even found the suggestion that weather caused the
decline to be disrespectful to the sheep, implying that they
were too stupid to take care of themselves in their own
homeland. The biggest point of contention between Kluane
people on the one hand and outfitters and biologists on the
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other was over the significance of human hunting. Kluane
people identified hunting, especially by outfitters, as the
single most important factor leading to the decline of the
sheep population. They advocated a total ban on sheep
hunting in the region or, failing that, a quota on the number
of sheep that could be taken.
RRSSC members’ different positions regarding the na-
ture of the decline in sheep and its possible remedies arose,
at least in part, from the different ways in which each
experienced and came to know about sheep in the first
place. Wildlife biologists, for example, generated knowl-
edge about sheep primarily through a number of formal
activities (i.e., “research”), the most important of which
was an aerial survey conducted by helicopter. The results of
this research were then disseminated in the form of written
reports and scientific papers. In contrast, First Nation elders
and hunters based their understandings of sheep on personal
experiences gained over many years spent out on the land
while hunting, trapping, fishing, guiding, and traveling.
They shared these experiences and the lessons they drew
from them orally, in the form of stories, rather than in
written form. As we shall see, these differences led RRSSC
members to have very different understandings about Ruby
Range sheep. At an even more fundamental level, commit-
tee members disagreed (at least implicitly) on what consti-
tuted valid knowledge about sheep in the first place, and
even on the nature of the sheep themselves (for a more
comprehensive discussion of the different ways in which
different RRSSC members produced knowledge about sheep,
see Nadasdy, 2003: chap. 4).
The disagreement between First Nation people, on the
one hand, and biologists and outfitters, on the other, also
had obvious political dimensions. Dall rams, with their
large curving horns, are a prized trophy animal for big
game hunters all over the world. As trophy animals, Dall
sheep represent a significant potential income for big game
outfitters, who charge hunters substantial sums for their
hunts, as well as for the territorial government, which sells
hunting licenses and collects trophy fees and taxes. At the
same time, Dall sheep have been an important part of the
diet of First Nation people in the southwest Yukon for at
least the last 2000 years (see McClellan, 1975:120, and
Arthurs, 1995, for historical and archeological evidence of
sheep hunting, respectively). Kluane people continue to
think of themselves as sheep hunters. They speak highly of
the virtues of sheep meat and occasionally have gone to
great lengths to get it. I was told one story, from the days
before the restoration of KFN people’s hunting rights in the
neighboring Kluane National Park and Game Sanctuary, in
which a man risked fines and imprisonment to get sheep for
his father’s funeral potlatch, because he felt that a proper
ceremony could not be held without sheep meat. I also
heard countless stories about specific sheep hunts, some of
which had occurred as far back as the turn of the century
(see McClellan, 1975:121 – 122 for accounts of mythic
stories and ritual behavior associated with sheep). Kluane
people have detailed knowledge of where to go to hunt
sheep and can locate dozens of traditional sheep hunting
camps throughout their territory, many of which are in the
Ruby Range. Finally, on several occasions, I heard Kluane
people specifically use their self-ascribed status as sheep
hunters to contrast themselves to members of a neighboring
First Nation, whom they claimed did not traditionally rely
on sheep for subsistence. Despite the importance of sheep
hunting to Kluane people, however, KFN members claimed
that they had refrained completely from hunting sheep in
the Ruby Range for several years prior to the formation of
the RRSSC, out of concern for the sheep population.
Struggles between those who see animals as trophies
and those who see them as food have historically played an
important role in characterizing the politics of big game
hunting in the Yukon (see McCandless, 1985; n.d.). In the
case of sheep, the struggle is especially intense. It is so
intense that, despite overwhelming archaeological and
oral evidence, it was not until 1998 (after the RRSSC
process had ended) that the territorial government at last
formally acknowledged that Dall sheep should be classi-
fied as a traditional subsistence animal under the KFN’s
land-claim agreement. Until that time, the government had
refused to include sheep with moose and caribou as ani-
mals to which First Nation people had special rights in the
event of the need to establish a Total Allowable Harvest as
per 16.9.0 of the Yukon Final Agreement (Council for
Yukon Indians, 1993:176 – 177). Despite the intensity of
the struggle over sheep in the region, outfitters and First
Nation people, the two most important groups involved in
the struggle, have very different degrees of access to state
power. Although First Nation people’s political presence
in the territory has increased dramatically over the past 30
years, there remains a wide gulf between First Nation
communities and the halls of power in Whitehorse. Big
game outfitters, on the other hand, have historically had
considerable influence in the territorial government. That
influence is due at least in part to the financial benefits that
accrue to the Yukon Government from outfitting, but other
factors also contribute to the outfitters’ political clout. For
one thing, outfitting is an old and respected (not to mention
colorful) tradition in the Yukon, and today’s outfitters, as
practitioners of that tradition, can draw on powerful his-
torical imagery to justify their positions. Another source
of outfitter strength is their political organization. Though
there are only 20 outfitters in the Yukon, they present a
common front through the actions of the well-organized
and very active Yukon Outfitter’s Association, a political
force to be reckoned with in the territory. Perhaps the
greatest source of their political strength, however, is their
membership in an elite stratum of Yukon society. Business
and government in the territory are dominated by a rela-
tively small number of businessmen who are long-time
Yukoners, and outfitters have traditionally been among
the members of this group. In 1995, for example, when the
RRSSC was formed, at least two members of the Yukon
Legislative Assembly—one of whom was the government
leader—were ex-outfitters.
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Because of the outfitters’ political power, it would have
been difficult for the Yukon Department of Renewable
Resources to implement any management initiatives op-
posed by outfitters (e.g., a ban on hunting), regardless of
RRSSC recommendations. This is not to say that it would
have been impossible, but at the very least, wildlife man-
agers would have had to produce evidence convincing to
Yukon politicians to support such action. And, despite
rhetoric about the value of TEK, this still means evidence
produced by biologists, not the uncorroborated testimony
of First Nation elders—especially if that testimony contra-
dicts the biological evidence.
Such was the political context into which the RRSSC
was born. As discussed above, an important part of the
RRSSC process was to translate First Nation elders’ and
hunters’ understandings (and indeed all RRSSC members’
understandings) into a form compatible with the reports
and published papers of wildlife biologists (i.e., written
text, numbers, lines on maps). Integration of these knowl-
edge artifacts remained far from straightforward, how-
ever, despite their common form. Many of the obstacles to
integration appeared to be technical or methodological.
Sheep move around, and population sizes fluctuate over
time. Everyone’s understanding of sheep, then, is neces-
sarily based on where, when, and how each person ob-
served or interacted with them. Thus, it was often extremely
difficult to compare one RRSSC member’s knowledge of
Ruby Range sheep with another’s, even after they had been
translated into a form compatible with scientific wildlife
management. I turn now to an examination of these meth-
odological obstacles to knowledge-integration, not be-
cause they prevented knowledge-integration, but
because—in one case—they did not.
TIME, SPACE, AND THE INTEGRATION
OF KNOWLEDGE
Time
The temporal dimension is vital to the practice of
wildlife management. Time structures what and how peo-
ple know about animal populations. Temporal differences
in what RRSSC members knew about Ruby Range sheep
provided an incentive for knowledge-integration, but at
the same time, acted as an obstacle. Temporal differences
existed on a number of different levels, from the length of
time (in years) that various RRSSC members had been
observing sheep in the Ruby Range to the time of year
when they made these observations. All of these differ-
ences played a role in the dynamics of co-management in
the RRSSC.
To manage wildlife effectively, one must have good
long-term knowledge of wildlife populations. One must
know how these populations are changing, why they are
changing, and what can be done to effect desired changes.
Especially important for management is an understanding
of the impact of human activity on animal populations.
Since even “stable” wildlife populations experience sig-
nificant fluctuation from year to year, however, it can
often be very difficult to determine the causes—or even
the significance—of changes in population size. In an
ideal situation, in which biologists have good long-term
data from a population in a fairly natural state, they might
feel confident in their ability to distinguish the effects of
human activity from the stochastic fluctuations experi-
enced by wildlife populations in the absence of humans.
Unfortunately, such long-term scientific data on animal
populations do not exist in the North, where wildlife
biology is a relatively recent arrival. The Yukon Govern-
ment, for example, did not hire a wildlife biologist until
1974, the year of the first Ruby Range sheep survey. This
problem is further compounded by the expense of conduct-
ing wildlife surveys, which has made it impossible for
biologists to carry out regular surveys of animal populations
in all but a few relatively small areas, even since their
arrival in 1974. As biologists themselves admit, this con-
stitutes a serious limitation to their knowledge of wildlife
in the territory, often making it difficult for them to assess
the effects of human activity on wildlife populations. To
make up for their lack of temporal data on animal
populations, biologists focus on maximizing the data ob-
tained from animals taken by hunters and make compari-
sons between different (spatially separate) populations of
the same species.
Ruby Range sheep are exceptional among Yukon wild-
life populations for the amount and time-depth of the data
that have been collected about them. Biologists first sur-
veyed Ruby Range sheep in 1974 and have been doing so
relatively consistently since 1979. Thus, they are better
able to assess the impact of human activity on the Ruby
Range sheep population than on nearly any other animal
population in the Yukon. Given the history of this region,
however, 20 years of data are still inadequate. Serious
over-hunting occurred in parts of the territory at least as
early as the Klondike gold rush in 1898. Although the
population (and the pressure on wildlife) subsided some-
what in later years, the rise of the big game outfitting
industry and several subsequent short-lived population
booms (most notably the result of Alaska Highway con-
struction in 1941 – 42) continued to put pressure on wild-
life populations in the region. All of these events, especially
the building of the highway, affected wildlife populations
in the Kluane area, sometimes quite significantly (Hoefs,
1981; McCandless, 1985). Indeed, as Kluane elder Dick
Dickson (pers. comm. 1996) put it, “You think game is
scarce around here today? You should have seen it when
the [Alaska] highway came through.” Although biologists
attempt in several ways to “factor out” human impact on
these populations, their methods are necessarily based on
educated guesswork.
In contrast, First Nation elders and hunters have been in
the Yukon for considerably longer than 25 years. Indeed,
some elders have detailed memories of the Ruby Range
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from as far back as the 1920s, and they heard stories of
earlier times from their own elders. These people do not
depend on costly helicopters to see sheep in the Ruby
Range, nor do they have to juggle the need to survey those
sheep with the need to study other wildlife populations
throughout the territory, all on a single limited budget.
Rather, they observe sheep in the Ruby Range as a natural
part of their lives out on the land hunting and trapping. As
a result, their knowledge of Ruby Range sheep has fewer
temporal gaps than the biological survey data (I am speak-
ing here of the village viewed collectively. Certainly there
are gaps in specific individuals’ personal experiences of
the Ruby Range, but it would be difficult to find a long
stretch of time during which no one in the village visited
the region.)
Proponents of knowledge-integration often cite such
differences in the temporal dimensions of TEK and sci-
ence as a primary reason for integrating them, since the
long-term observations of First Nation hunters can com-
plement the more occasional but intensive observations
made by biologists and resource managers. By integrating
these two sets of information, many resource managers
hope to be able to extend their knowledge of animal
populations significantly into the past (Ferguson and
Messier, 1997). Indeed, it is precisely to supplement their
inadequate data about animal populations that many north-
ern resource managers have begun turning to TEK.
Biologists involved in the RRSSC process explicitly
acknowledged such knowledge-integration as one of the
most important advantages to managing the Ruby Range
sheep cooperatively; however, despite this acknowledg-
ment and the apparent advantages of integrating hunters’
perspectives on Ruby Range sheep with their own, biolo-
gists have proved unwilling or unable to incorporate First
Nation hunters’ accounts of past population sizes into their
model of the Ruby Range population. According to every
single hunter who spoke to the RRSSC, there were once
many more sheep in the Ruby Range than there are today,
and all agreed that the population decline began well
before the first aerial survey was conducted in 1974 (and
certainly before these surveys became a regular occur-
rence in 1979). This would seem to be an ideal situation for
the temporal extension of biological data through the use
of TEK. Yet this never happened.
Before RRSSC members could decide what manage-
ment strategies to adopt, they had to agree on a target
population to manage for. This entailed long hours of
debate over what would constitute a healthy sheep popu-
lation in the Ruby Range. The committee might have tried
to integrate TEK and science by developing a population
model based on a combination of testimony by elders and
hunters and the aerial survey data (not to mention other
inputs, such as those provided by outfitters). Instead,
biologists and First Nation people each used their own
knowledge of past sheep populations to back up their
arguments over what constituted an appropriate target
population. Rather than integrating what they knew about
sheep, RRSSC members struggled with one another over
whose knowledge they should use to set this target level.
The RRSSC finally agreed on the objective of restoring
the Ruby Range sheep population to its 1980 level, the
highest ever recorded by an aerial survey (RRSSC, 1996a).
According to the survey data, this meant a target popula-
tion of 1314 sheep for the entire study area. This figure,
however, was well below First Nation expectations. Elders
and hunters had been adamant that the population had once
been much larger than this (indeed, they said that by 1980
the population decline was already well under way). In the
end, however, they were forced to agree to this level
because biologists (and outfitters) were completely un-
willing to entertain the possibility of setting a higher one.
Whether or not they trusted the accuracy of the First
Nation testimony (and some RRSSC members clearly did
not), biologists simply could not accept that testimony as
a basis for action because they had no way of independ-
ently verifying that the sheep population had ever been any
higher than the 1980 level. Given the sensitive political
nature of sheep management, and the much greater weight
accorded to scientific evidence than to First Nation testi-
mony by the powerful interests involved, biologists needed
to be able to back any recommendations with scientific
evidence. As a result, biologists could not (and did not)
accord the testimony of elders and hunters the same status
they gave to their own survey data. It is perhaps not so
surprising, then, that very little knowledge-integration
actually occurred. The First Nation settled on the 1980
population as the target level because it was the highest
that biologists would go, and biologists would go that high
only because they themselves had counted that many
sheep in the study area.
Biologists were not the only members of the RRSSC to
question or undervalue other people’s knowledge about
sheep in the Ruby Range. First Nation people, for their part,
often criticized the knowledge of biologists as part of their
effort to establish their own knowledge as legitimate. They
frequently contrasted biologists’ (and current outfitters’)
status as relative newcomers to the area with their own
personal and family histories. They referred to the many
years that they and their parents and grandparents had
hunted in the area, claiming that this wealth of experience
gave them knowledge of the sheep that far surpassed any
that might be gained from a dozen or so annual surveys
from a helicopter. In making this argument, First Nation
hunters were not simply saying that they had spent more
time observing sheep than had biologists, though this was
certainly part of their point. They were also commenting on
the quality of those observations, claiming that over many
years spent hunting out on the land, they had also learned
how to observe animals. This may at first seem an odd
argument to someone who has not spent any time hunting.
Whenever I went out with experienced hunters, however, I
was constantly impressed by their ability to spot animals.
I was always the last to see them, usually after someone had
pointed them out to me. And, of course, a good hunter does
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not need to see animals to know they are there. By noting
tracks and other signs, he or she can get a fairly good sense
of what animals are in the area, without ever actually seeing
them. It became clear to me, as I spent time with these
hunters, that it would take me many years of studying
animals out on the land before I could hope even to
approach their powers of observation. First Nation hunters
are justifiably proud of their abilities in this regard; thus,
elders and hunters on the RRSSC felt uniquely qualified to
comment on the state of the sheep population in the Ruby
Range. At the same time, they mistrusted the observations
of biologists, whom they saw as lacking the very kinds of
experiences they considered essential to being a good
observer. As elder and hunter Frank Joe put it:
I do look at sheep when I go up the valley. Lots of time I
never see any. I cover lots of country, I never see nothing.
Just what we seen last year, is what I seen up in the Ruby.
Head of Marshall Creek, I never seen no sheep there. My
cousin went in there with Junior Moose; he saw two
rams...Where I went myself, I never seen any. People say
they’re all around. With the plane they seen lots of sheep.
When I was there I look around. I look pretty good around
there. I’m used to looking for the game; I’m trained for
that. Can spot a sheep or bear, anything, moose, caribou
anywhere in the bush. Can spot it from here to across the
lake. Sheep, I never seen any. (KFN and YTG, 1996:12)
There were other important temporal differences in
RRSSC members’ knowledge of sheep. Because of the
vastness of the territory and the time and expense involved
in conducting wildlife research, for example, biologists
can at best hope to survey a given animal population once
a year. In fact, even in the case of Ruby Range sheep, one
of the most studied animal populations in the territory,
biologists have fallen short of this modest ideal. Faced
with this reality, they are careful to time their surveys so as
to maximize the data they can collect. In the Ruby Range,
for instance, they have traditionally flown their surveys in
June, so that they could count the number of yearlings that
survived the winter in addition to the number of lambs
born. Also, since sheep have seasonal movement patterns,
biologists must fly their annual surveys at the same time
every year, or they cannot compare their results from year
to year.
By contrast, although elders and hunters do not cover as
much ground in a single day as biologists in a helicopter,
they do see animals all year round and have a good idea of
what they do and where they are throughout the entire
year—not just on two days in June. In the Ruby Range,
elders and hunters see sheep not only on the lambing cliffs
in springtime (where biologists see them) but also in their
winter and summer ranges. They watch them come down
to mineral licks, note where they cross between mountain
ranges, and watch them in the rut. Whereas biologists
know the sheep population through a series of detailed but
static and temporally isolated “snapshots,” elders and
hunters experience sheep more continuously through time.
Rather than attempting to integrate these two different
views of the lives of sheep, however, RRSSC members
used them to deny the validity of one another’s knowledge.
First Nation people claimed that biologists’ lamb counts
gave an inaccurate picture of the population because of
high mortality rates in the period immediately following
the counts. Biologists felt that because First Nation people
do not systematically count sheep at the same time every
year, they do not have an adequate basis for identifying
changes in the population.
Space
Like time, geography also structured how different
RRSSC members viewed the problem of sheep in the Ruby
Range. In fact, the different geographical dimensions of
their knowledge about sheep played an important role in
the very formation of the RRSSC and the creation of its
mandate. As it turns out, First Nation elders and hunters
did not see the decline in the sheep population as limited
to the Ruby and Nisling Ranges. In fact, some elders and
hunters present at the November 1995 meeting had actu-
ally spent very little time hunting in the Ruby Range.
Although they were aware of the situation there, these
elders and hunters were also deeply concerned about what
they saw as equally severe sheep declines in other areas
where they had hunted extensively. Douglas Dickson (KFN
and YTG, 1996:19) described the most important such
area, found to the north, between the White River and the
Alaska border:
Like, White River, when I first went into that area hunting,
that was 1953, I was 13 years old. I could sit on a mountain
between Rabbit Creek and Boulder Creek, where Dickie
[Dickson] was talking about; I’d count 600 sheep. Two
deep valleys like. Twenty years later I came back there,
could still count 600 sheep. A lot of time a guy could count
350 sheep in one day. I hunted [as a guide] I’d say 20 trips,
and I’d get a sheep in one day. I never ever got skunked
with a hunter. I’d take hunters out and I’d get game, but
White River, it’s just a cinch to get a sheep in one day.
Now, like David [Dickson] he says, the last time I hunted
up there was in 1988. He’s having trouble getting sheep,
the same place… Now David says he has to hunt like hell
to get sheep.
Aside from two large-scale aerial surveys (in 1974 and
1993) and data on the sheep killed by non–First Nation
hunters, however, biologists had very little knowledge of
sheep populations in the White River area. As a result, they
were unwilling to include this area in the mandate of the
RRSSC. At the first meeting of the committee in Decem-
ber 1995, members decided that the committee would limit
its activity to that area about which “both government and
First Nations have some knowledge” (RRSSC, 1995:3).
This decision effectively limited RRSSC activities to the
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study area used by biologists in their aerial surveys of the
Ruby Range. First Nation RRSSC members were not
altogether happy about this, since the study area represents
just a small fraction of the area about which they were
concerned, excluding not only the White River area, but
also the majority of the Nisling Range. At subsequent
RRSSC meetings, elders and hunters occasionally tried to
extend the RRSSC’s mandate beyond the Ruby Range, but
to no avail.
Biologists acknowledged that the decline in sheep was
not limited to the Ruby Range, stating that it was occurring
in “virtually every accessible population in the territory”
and into Alaska (RRSSC, 1996b:5). Indeed, they reported
to the RRSSC that “Alaska reports a 40 – 70% decline in
almost all of their sheep populations, even in areas with
little or no harvest” (YTG, 1997:7). Despite this, however,
biologists were unwilling to comply with First Nation
requests to expand the RRSSC’s mandate into other areas
of concern because “there is not enough survey informa-
tion from other parts of the Yukon to know how wide-
spread the declines are there” (YTG, 1997:7). Thus, rather
than increasing their total stock of knowledge about sheep
by integrating the localized knowledge of biologists with
the more extensive knowledge of hunters, RRSSC mem-
bers ended up struggling with one another over whose
knowledge to use. First Nation people felt that biologists’
knowledge about the decline in sheep was too limited
geographically. Biologists, for their part, were unwilling
to accept hunters’ knowledge of sheep outside the Ruby
Range study area as the sole basis for a management
strategy in those areas.
There were other ways in which geographic differences
in how RRSSC members knew sheep caused them to
question the validity of one another’s knowledge. The
Ruby Range study area is divided into game management
subzones and outfitter areas. It is also divided into several
different trapline concessions and split by a boundary
between two First Nation traditional territories. These
arbitrary geographical divisions directly affect people’s
experience of the land and therefore structure their knowl-
edge of it; yet they overlap with and otherwise fail to
correspond to one another. This makes any attempt to
compare different people’s knowledge of the land very
complex. Biologists, for example, conduct their sheep
counts by game management subzone. Since these subzones
do not correspond to the outfitter areas, and since outfitters
count sheep in their own area, it is difficult to compare the
counts of biologists with those of outfitters (one outfitter,
however, did record his sheep counts by subzone. He was
the same outfitter who “found” the sheep missing in the
1996 survey).
This lack of geographical correspondence becomes even
more pronounced when we consider how individual First
Nation elders and hunters experience the land. In the
Yukon, there is no formal division of land into different
hunting areas (although it is divided into different areas for
trapping), but every First Nation hunter hunts and fishes in
different places over the course of the year. Though differ-
ent hunters may share any given place, no two hunters hunt
and fish in exactly the same set of places. Thus, each
hunter has what we might call a personal hunting area
(which includes everywhere that a hunter goes in the bush,
whether to hunt, fish, trap, pick berries, cut wood, or
whatever). These personal areas may overlap, but no two
are identical. Studies mapping the personal hunting areas
of individual hunters in the same community (Brody,
1982) have shown that these areas vary significantly in
size, shape, and location. This is certainly the case in
Burwash Landing as well. Elders and hunters regularly
share their observations and thoughts about the land and
animals with one another, so that their knowledge of the
land extends beyond their own personal hunting area. But
when biologists ask them for specific information about
animal sightings (e.g., sheep counts), they necessarily
supply this information from their own experiences in
their own unique hunting areas. This means that the testi-
mony of individual First Nation people and the numbers
that they provide to biologists may vary considerably from
one person to another, especially considering the high
level of geographical and temporal variation in the boreal
forest (Nelson, 1983). Some biologists and resource man-
agers misinterpret these differences among hunters as
evidence for the unreliability of TEK, and this makes them
suspicious of First Nation people’s knowledge altogether.
One biologist told me that he had misgivings about
integrating TEK and knowledge because of the “subjec-
tive” nature of TEK. He said that it was “too fluid and
dependent upon individuals” to be integrated with science.
Not only does TEK change over time, he said—perhaps
reflecting changes in the world—but it also varies accord-
ing to the hunter or elder with whom you talk. This, of
course, is anathema to scientists. Scientific knowledge
must be reproducible; it must be true for everyone, or it
cannot be considered knowledge at all. When biologists
are confronted by inconsistent and conflicting testimony
by elders and hunters, some assume that this testimony is
unreliable, while others recognize the complexity of the
problem but are unsure how to deal with it. First Nation
people and scientists alike make much of the fact that TEK
is inherently local, that it is rooted in a particular place.
Yet, by failing to use TEK because of differences between
hunters (either because they see it as invalid or because
they do not know how to use it), biologists and resource
managers implicitly deny the local nature of First Nation
people’s experiences on the land. The fact that this knowl-
edge is not used (even by those biologists who recognize
its validity) because it does not fit easily into the practices
of bureaucratic wildlife management highlights the biases
inherent in the project of knowledge-integration.
This lack of geographical correspondence is further
compounded when we consider its relation to the temporal
differences discussed above. We saw that people’s knowl-
edge of sheep is constrained by the times when they
encounter them. Biologists count the sheep population in
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the spring, while outfitters interact with sheep during the
licensed hunting season (late summer and early fall). Even
First Nation people’s observations of sheep are necessar-
ily time-dependent, since there are places that they visit
with varying frequency or only for seasonally specific
activities (like berry-picking or trapping). These temporal
differences have an important geographical component,
because sheep ignore the arbitrary administrative lines
that humans draw on maps as they go about their seasonal
movements. Thus, the timing of a sheep count can affect
not only where one will see sheep, but also whether one
sees them at all. For example, sheep that have their lambs
outside the biologists’ study area, but whose summer
range in the study area overlaps an outfitter’s concession,
will be counted by outfitters but not by biologists. This, in
fact, is precisely how one outfitter accounted for the
discrepancy between his own counts and those of biolo-
gists (RRSSC, 1996b). He argued that it was inappropriate
to use the biologists’ aerial survey data to manage sheep
hunting in his area, since spring counts did not accurately
reflect the population found there during hunting season.
As we have seen, however, such temporal/geographical
discrepancies were not an insurmountable obstacle to
knowledge-integration. In fact, biologists and outfitter
subsequently overcame them and did succeed in integrat-
ing one another’s knowledge to solve the problem of the
sheep missing from the 1996 survey.
TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF
KNOWLEDGE-INTEGRATION
Members of the RRSSC were aware of the temporal and
geographical differences in one another’s knowledge of
sheep before the RRSSC process even began. Indeed, the
existence of such differences was one of the primary
incentives for engaging in co-management in the first
place. The fact that different people knew about Ruby
Range sheep at different times and places meant that
RRSSC members could, in theory, pool their knowledge,
creating a collective knowledge base that would exceed
any individual’s knowledge not only in quality, but also in
temporal and geographical scope. At the same time, these
temporal and geographical differences made it extremely
difficult to compare and integrate different people’s knowl-
edge. What exactly is one to make of the differences
between a June and a July sheep count, or between a count
by game management subzone and one by outfitting area?
What of the differences in the testimony of various First
Nation hunters who have different hunting areas? There is
no objective formula into which one can plug such incom-
parable data. If one is to make sense of these disparities,
then one must engage in a process of creative interpreta-
tion. The case of the 100 missing sheep is a perfect
example of such a process.
Although the biologists and outfitter had both counted
sheep by game management subzone (avoiding a geo-
graphical discrepancy), other differences made their counts
difficult to compare. Biologists had counted sheep from
the air in July, while the outfitter had counted them from
the ground in August. Integrating these two counts re-
quired an act of imagination; one had to imagine the sheep
leaving the area in June and returning in August. Either
party could have rejected this interpretation for any number
of reasons (e.g., reasons based on their understanding of
sheep behavior). Even more important, biologists and
outfitter had to be willing to accept and act upon the
number of sheep reported by the other.
The notion of trust occupies a prominent place in the
rhetoric of co-management. Government and First Nation
participants in co-management processes are routinely
urged to “trust one another” and warned that, without such
trust, co-management cannot succeed. Certainly, biolo-
gists and outfitters had to trust one another to be truthful,
to report the number of sheep they really saw. Likewise,
each had to have confidence in the other’s method of
counting sheep. That is, they had to trust one another’s
ability to generate accurate data. Without these two forms
of trust, they could not have integrated their knowledge as
they did. But it was not enough for biologists and outfitter
simply to trust one another; they also had to be willing to
act on one another’s information (i.e., to modify their own
numbers, or at least their understanding of the meaning of
those numbers, and to use those new numbers/meanings in
their management efforts). This is not the same thing as
trust. Indeed, the notion of trust must be viewed within the
broader context of power relations. Biologists, for exam-
ple, may have trusted the First Nation elders who said that
the sheep population had once been much higher than it
was in 1980 (i.e., they may have believed the elders to be
honest and even trusted them to generate accurate sheep
counts). But, given the political context of sheep hunting
in the Yukon, there is no way that biologists could have
accepted and acted upon First Nation elders’ accounts of
the size of past sheep populations. To do so would have
been to endorse the view that there had been a catastrophic
population decline requiring drastic and immediate action.
Aside from the fact that biologists did not believe this to be
the case, for them to have advocated a ban on sheep
hunting (or similar drastic action) in the absence of scien-
tific evidence to back it up would have been impossible.
Biologists on the RRSSC simply could not support a
ban on hunting (or even the imposition of a quota hunt)
based solely on Kluane people’s arguments, regardless of
how well they understood these arguments or how person-
ally sympathetic they might have been. Biologists have to
be able to justify (with scientific evidence) the positions
they take on wildlife management. They must be able to
answer the criticisms of other biologists employed by
those with competing political interests. For them to take
a position that they could not defend in this way would be
viewed as irresponsible. Outfitters and others could then
have criticized them for being biased and unscientific, and
they would have been unable to defend themselves against
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these charges. Their reputation as scientists would have
been damaged, and they might even have lost their jobs.
And all of this would have been for naught; considering the
political power wielded by outfitters in the territory, the
government could not have implemented a hunting ban (or
quota hunt) without incontrovertible scientific proof that
the sheep population had once been as high as Kluane
elders and hunters maintained. (It would have been diffi-
cult enough even with such proof.) In the absence of
scientific evidence, supporting Kluane people’s position
regarding the past population size of the Ruby Range
sheep population simply was not an option for biologists
on the RRSSC. Yet this is precisely what they would have
had to do if knowledge-integration were to succeed.
In the case of the RRSSC, the committee’s failure to
successfully integrate knowledge artifacts indicates more
than a simple lack of trust between committee members.
Indeed, the fact that the only instance of knowledge-
integration in the whole RRSSC process occurred between
an outfitter and biologists is quite significant; and this
significance was not lost on First Nation people. As we
have seen, the integration of biologist and outfitter data
that occurred in the case of the missing sheep was far from
straightforward; it required a certain amount of creative
interpretation to overcome the incomparability of the two
counts. The fact that integration occurred in spite of these
difficulties not only indicates that the outfitter and biolo-
gists trusted one another’s motives and methods enough to
work together to overcome these technical difficulties, but
also highlights the political dimensions of knowledge-
integration. Biologists had accepted the outfitter’s num-
bers at face value and were willing to base their actions (or
non-action, in this case) on them without requiring addi-
tional proof, despite the fact that those numbers differed
radically from their own. Kluane people felt that by doing
this, biologists were extending to the outfitter a degree of
trust that they had resolutely refused to extend to First
Nation people.
By this time in the RRSSC process, some Kluane people
had already begun to suspect that their position regarding
sheep was being dismissed on political or racial rather than
on intellectual grounds. When they saw that biologists
were willing to trust the outfitter, whose economic inter-
ests gave him a clear motive for fabricating the results of
his sheep count, and yet seemingly refused to trust the
word of some of the most respected people in their commu-
nity, they felt that their suspicions had been confirmed. In
addition, the fact that biologists and outfitters could come
to such an agreement without the consent, or even the
involvement, of KFN illustrates the differences in power
that existed between committee members.
Outfitters and First Nation people are unlikely to trust
one another with very detailed information about their
sheep sightings, so it is not surprising that biologists and
outfitters did not invite KFN to participate in these discus-
sions. However, the fact that Kluane people were also
denied the opportunity to question the validity and use of
the outfitter’s knowledge, especially considering the obvi-
ous motive for fabricating his results, clearly illustrates
the political dimensions of the incident. It is almost incon-
ceivable, for example, that First Nation people could have
excluded biologists and their knowledge from the process
(as they themselves had been excluded) and still have
effectively explained away such a dramatic change in the
sheep population. Yet, biologists were able to use outfitter
data in this way because there were no significant political
obstacles preventing them from doing so (as there were to
the use of First Nation people’s testimony). The case of the
missing sheep, perhaps more than any other single inci-
dent, caused Kluane people to lose confidence in the
RRSSC process.
CONCLUSION: REEVALUATING THE
CO-MANAGEMENT SUCCESS STORY
What was the ultimate outcome of the RRSSC process?
Did it work, or was it a failure? The opinions of RRSSC
members differed significantly on this question. Most
biologists and government officials involved in the RRSSC
were enthusiastic about the process. Some considered it
successful enough to cite it as a model for future co-
management efforts. Yet most of the KFN members in-
volved in the RRSSC process felt that it had been an utter
failure. On what basis did different RRSSC members make
these judgments?
The RRSSC mandate was to make recommendations to
the Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board regard-
ing the management of Ruby Range sheep. To a large
extent, committee members judged the success of the
process by assessing these recommendations. A quick
comparison of these recommendations with the different
positions on sheep management brought to the table by
various groups of RRSSC members provides an indication
of how RRSSC members could have viewed the process so
differently (RRSSC, 1997). Of the 24 recommendations
generated by the RRSSC, 12 dealt with the basically
noncontentious issues of harassment, access, education,
and predation. An additional six recommendations dealt
specifically with how and when to conduct future scien-
tific research. Five recommendations dealt with the con-
tentious issue of hunting, and these were more consistent
with the views of biologists and outfitters than with those
of First Nation people. They called for voluntary efforts by
all parties (as opposed to the imposition of a quota) to limit
their combined kill to a maximum of 2% of the total
population. If after two years, however, RRSSC members
were to decide that voluntary compliance was not work-
ing, the RRSSC was to reexamine the issue and “recom-
mend appropriate allocations” (RRSSC, 1997:8).
This may at first glance seem to be an equitable compro-
mise between First Nation people’s desire for an outright
ban on sheep hunting and the belief by outfitters and
biologists that no hunting restrictions were necessary. If
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we look at how this 2% was allocated, however, another
picture emerges. Outfitters had agreed to limit their kill to
2% of the population, while resident hunters were re-
quested to cease hunting sheep, and First Nation hunters
were expected not to resume hunting in the area. Thus,
“voluntary compliance” meant that outfitters got all the
sheep. One other hunting recommendation requested that
all parties “...should stop all hunting of ewes...” (RRSSC,
1997). This was clearly aimed at First Nation hunters,
since ewe hunting is illegal for non-First Nation hunters;
furthermore, the wording implied that First Nation people
had been hunting sheep (specifically ewes) in recent years
despite their explicit claims to the contrary throughout the
process. One last recommendation dealt with the issue of
traditional knowledge generally, but it had been so wa-
tered down that First Nation people felt it to be useless.
In the end, not even these limited recommendations
were implemented. As of spring 1998, only a single one of
them had been acted upon, and this was a recommendation
to restrict ATV use in part of the Ruby Range, an initiative
that had already been under consideration before the
RRSSC process began. RRSSC members had agreed to
limit sheep hunting in the area voluntarily, but even this
agreement unraveled when it became known that one
outfitter had killed 17 sheep during the 1997 season
despite his promise to limit himself to 12 (which was 2%
of the total population).
The fact that some RRSSC members considered the
process a success despite these apparent failures indicates
that different members judged the process by very differ-
ent criteria. Most biologists felt at the start that the Yukon
Minister of Renewable Resources was unlikely to limit
sheep hunting in the area regardless of RRSSC recommen-
dations. In fact, several biologists told me they feel quite
frustrated by the fact that political criteria tend to outweigh
scientific criteria in decision making for wildlife manage-
ment throughout the territory. One biologist told me that
he and other biologists viewed the RRSSC more as an
effort to reduce hostility between outfitters and the Kluane
First Nation than as a major management initiative, and
several of them said they felt that it had been something of
a victory just to get the different interest groups to sit down
together in a room and speak to one another in a civil
manner. They felt that the relationships that committee
members had built with one another and the frank discus-
sion of different views had been very positive develop-
ments. And the process had, after all, achieved its goal of
developing a set of consensus-based management recom-
mendations. Kluane people, however, based their assess-
ment of the process solely on its results for sheep
management. They had called the November 1995 meet-
ing because of their concerns about Ruby Range sheep;
and in three years, despite all the talk, nothing whatsoever
had changed. When it became known that the outfitter had
completely disregarded the commitments he made to the
RRSSC, the few Kluane people who still had any hope for
the process decided it had been more about appeasing KFN
than a real effort to jointly manage sheep. They wrote it off
as a complete waste of their time and resources.
Members of the RRSSC had very different ways of
knowing and talking about sheep, but over and over again
the methods and interpretations of biologists and outfitters
won out over those of First Nation people. This was due
not so much to the personalities of individual committee
members as to the nature of the RRSSC process itself and
of bureaucratic wildlife management more generally. Since
the RRSSC process was created within the context of (and
inserted into) existing systems of state resource manage-
ment, biologists had no choice but to undervalue the
artifacts of TEK vis-à-vis those of biology. This is be-
cause, given the politics of wildlife management in the
territory, decisions simply cannot be made on the basis of
TEK alone; biologists cannot accept TEK as a valid basis
for action in its own right without undermining their own
positions within the management system.
Despite the rhetoric of First Nation empowerment that
surrounds the project of co-management and knowledge-
integration, the RRSSC process has, if anything, increased
the power of Yukon government biologists vis-à-vis Kluane
people over the management of Ruby Range sheep. Not
only have biologists retained de facto control over sheep
management in the area, but their participation in the
RRSSC process enables them to forestall First Nation
criticisms on the grounds that they are now engaging in
cooperative management. And, because biologists now
possess codified versions of Kluane elders’ and hunters’
knowledge about sheep, it is no longer even necessary for
them to include actual First Nation elders and hunters in the
process of “incorporating traditional knowledge into the
management process.” In effect, then, co-management and
knowledge-integration—at least in the case of the RRSSC—
have served to further legitimate Yukon government biolo-
gists’ control over sheep management rather than to grant
Kluane people a measure of control over local wildlife.
Some members of the RRSSC disagree with this char-
acterization of the process. Others wholeheartedly agree
with it. Indeed, depending upon whom one talks to, one
will hear either a scathing indictment of the RRSSC proc-
ess or yet another co-management success story. By criti-
cizing the RRSSC—and, by extension, all efforts at
co-management—I have no wish to imply that every sin-
gle attempt at co-management throughout the North to
date has been an abject failure. The case of the RRSSC,
however, serves as a warning that we need to be far more
critical in our assessments of co-management. Co-man-
agement in its very conception is an exceedingly complex
set of cross-cultural negotiations. In the process, even
supposedly agreed-upon meanings are contested at multi-
ple levels. To understand how well a particular effort at co-
management has worked (or even what “worked” means)
is as difficult as understanding the cultural nuances of the
negotiations themselves.
Some otherwise sympathetic readers will no doubt be
frustrated that I offer no practical or constructive solutions
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to the problems with co-management that I have identi-
fied. While I believe that there are solutions to these
problems, those solutions—like the problems themselves—
are political rather than technical in nature. For example,
I have suggested elsewhere (Nadasdy, 1999) that one
possible solution to the political problems of co-manage-
ment might be to devolve full decision-making power over
wildlife (as opposed to merely the power to make recom-
mendations) to local First Nations. Solutions of this sort
are, for political reasons, unlikely to be implemented or
even recognized as potential solutions, but this does not
invalidate them; it only serves to highlight the inherently
political nature of wildlife management. Indeed, rather
than challenging the larger political context in which
wildlife management occurs, co-management regimes have
merely been inserted into existing structures of bureau-
cratic wildlife management—the very same structures that
are at the root of the problems I identify in this article (see
Nadasdy, in press). And since co-management takes for
granted the wider political context of wildlife manage-
ment, solutions to the political problems I identify cannot
be found in the realm of co-management at all. Those
involved in co-management, after all, are in the business of
solving management problems, such as the problem of the
missing sheep, not of addressing political issues, such as
who should have jurisdiction over wildlife in the Yukon.
Since it is not simply a matter of “fixing” co-management
(e.g., by improving techniques for gathering information
or integrating knowledge or by tweaking the structures of
particular co-management regimes) but of restructuring
the very institutions, practices, and underlying assump-
tions of wildlife management itself, the kinds of solutions
I would offer are not likely to strike most readers—
especially those actually engaged in efforts to co-manage
resources—as particularly practical or constructive.
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